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LEGISLATION NOTES
CONVEYANCING-THE ROLES OF THE REAL ESTATE BROKER
AND THE LAWYER IN ORDINARY REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS-WHEREIN LIES THE PUBLIC
INTEREST?
To what extent may a real estate broker be involved in the convey-
ancing process1 once he has performed his traditional function-the bring-
ing together of a ready, willing and able buyer and seller? This problem,
defining the role a broker should play in an ordinary real estate transac-
tion, has been often litigated, especially in recent years, 2 but no clear-
cut solution has emerged. Solutions necessarily involve the courts in
public policy determinations of what documents involved in the convey-
ancing process, if any, may be prepared by the broker. Such determi-
nations inevitably turn upon the result of a delicate balancing process
whereby the courts weigh the relative importance of two broad con-
cepts-"public protection" and "public convenience," the element of
protection being stressed by the lawyer, and that of convenience being
stressed by the broker.$
The public interest necessitates that a workable solution to the problem
be formulated:
No real estate transaction can be said to be unimportant. Whether it involves an
inexpensive lot upon which the purchaser expects to build a home or a business
property of greater worth, the undertaking . . . is likely to be one of the most
1. The "conveyancing process" is the process whereby absolute title or a lesser
interest in real property is transferred from one party to another; it includes prep-
aration of all documents from the preliminary contract to the deed.
2. The broker-lawyer controversy had its origins only thirty years ago: "The
general law of unauthorized practice is a recent phenomenon, hardly pre-dating the
Depression of the 1930's." Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized Practice of
Law Controversy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 423, 424 (1969). The real estate broker was
an early target of unauthorized practice committees. See generally Report of the
Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 61 A.B.A. REP. 704, 713-15
(1936); Symposium on The Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy, 5 LAW &
CONTEM. PROB. (1938). The controversy continues today. See Report of the
Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 91 A.B.A. REP. 220,
221 (1966).
3. The lawyer (protection) versus broker (convenience) approach reeks of
the "good guy"."bad guy" approach which does justice to neither viewpoint. To
say that the broker is against public protection, or that the lawyer is against public
convenience, is overly simplistic and undoubtedly untrue. It is, however, a fair
and useful classification for the purpose of demonstrating the distinctive viewpoint
of each as to which concept deserves more weight in the balancing process.
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important in the lifetime of the buyer. Hence . . . important and essential in-
quiries are, or should be, made.4
By whom these "essential inquiries" should be made is disputed: the
broker contends that he is qualified to make them, 5 and the lawyer insists
that only he is so qualified.6 "Absolute public protection" demands that
essential inquiries and preparation of all documents involved in the con-
veyancing process be handled by those most qualified to do so, namely,
lawyers.7 According to this view, the preparation of these documents by
brokers would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 8 "Absolute
public convenience," on the other hand, dictates that the title transferring
process be both expeditious and inexpensive.9 Unnecessary delays re-
sulting from the interjection of lawyers into the transaction, and added
expenses such as legal fees should be eliminated from the ordi-
nary real estate transaction. Preparation of all necessary documents by
the broker, according to this line of thought, would not constitute the prac-
4. Houck, Drafting of Real Estate Instruments: The Problem from the Stand-
point of the Bar, 5 LAW & CONTEM. PROB. 66, 67 (1938) (emphasis added). See
also infra note 100 and accompanying text.
5. Herbert Nelson, Executive Vice-President of the National Association of Real
Estate Boards, expressed the broker's position: " [A] licensed real estate broker, not
authorized to practice law, is competent, and should be permitted by law, to select,
draft and complete preliminary contracts, simple deeds, simple leases, land con-
tracts and mortgages, if he does so in the course of his business to consummate
transactions in which he is interested as agent or broker, and if he neither holds
himself out to the public as one specially authorized to do these acts nor receives
compensation for the preparation of these instruments." Nelson, Drafting of Real
Estate Instruments: The Problem from the Standpoint of the Realtors, 5 LAW &
CONTEM. PROB. 57, 59 (1938). Although this view was expressed more than thirty
years ago, the broker's view has not changed since.
6. "[I]t is clearly in the public interest that every inquiry necessary to safe-
guard a party's interests . . . be made . . . by one qualified, competent, and author-
ized, or licensed, by law to make it [i.e., a lawyer]; and that none be intrusted to
one whose interests conflict with, or are adverse to, those of the person he serves
[i.e., a broker]." Houck, supra note 4, at 67. "As a minimum [the public] should
have the formal protection and the advice and assistance of disinterested and tech-
nically qualified counsel." Payne, supra note 2, at 470.
7. Although the public has not always accepted the truth of this proposition, an
arguendo assumption of the validity of this statement must be made for purposes
of this comment. Brokers would contend that they are competent, but probably
would concede that lawyers are most qualified.
8. See State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76,
366 P.2d 1 (1961), supplemented 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962); Chicago Bar
Association v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 2d 388, 203 N.E.2d 131 (1964).
9. This view depends upon the validity of the assertion that closing real estate
deals can be competently accomplished by a broker. Even assuming the truth of
that assertion as to actual matters of title, it fails to encompass important collateral
matters, such as advice as to tax implications. Improper information, or silence
as to these collateral matters can be extremely "costly."
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tice of law, or if so, would not be unauthorized practice.10 The vari-
ous results of the balancing process have fortunately been rooted in the
fertile middle ground between these absolutes."
The clash between two such powerful interest groups-brokers and law-
yers-has all too often obscured the interest of the ultimate beneficiary
of the conveyancing controversy-the public. The public is incapable of
protecting its own interest for a variety of reasons; 12 in short, the public
wants protection, but only if it is convenient. The onus is, therefore,
on the lawyers, the real estate brokers and the courts to formulate and
implement solutions to the conveyancing problem which maximize both
public protection and public convenience. Such solutions are possible,
if a broker-lawyer compromise is accepted as a necessity. The broker
must at least be allowed to prepare a document which will evidence that
he has brought together a ready, willing and able buyer and seller, thereby
earning his commission: working within such a compromise, the lawyers,
brokers and courts must then focus their attention on safeguards to protect
the public interest.
The Illinois solution to the broker-lawyer controversy can be a model
for other states to follow. The 1966 Illinois Supreme Court, recog-
nizing the need for a broker-lawyer compromise, held, in The Chicago
10. See Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963); Conway-
Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957);
In re Matthews, 58 Idaho 772, 79 P.2d 535 (1938); State v. Indiana Real Estate
Ass'n., Inc., 244 Ind. 214, 191 N.E.2d 711 (1963); State Bar of Michigan v. Kupris,
366 Mich. 688, 116 N.W.2d 341 (1962); Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Nel-
ler Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955); Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642,
290 N.W. 795 (1940); Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952); State
v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
11. See Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1950);
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 34 Il1. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771 (1966);
Gustafson v. V.C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 392, 35 N.E.2d 435 (1941);
Commonwealth v. Jones & Robbins, Inc., 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947);
Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 251
P.2d 619 (1952).
12. For example, the laws of real property are extremely complex; the average
buyer is involved in the conveyancing process only an extremely limited number of
times; the resulting injuries are often not immediately suffered, but may be mani-
fested years later when the property is resold, or the owner dies; the damages are
often of a nebulous nature-the market price might be affected by an undeterminable
amount, or more favorable tax consequences could have been obtained; and title
companies and licensed brokers are clothed with indicia of authority. John Payne
noted that "the home buyer is engaged in a highly technical transaction about
which he is inexperienced; . . . he dislikes lawyers; . . . he is therefore receptive to
the suggestion that laymen carry out the entire transaction for him, particularly if
some of the services are 'free.' He wants complete security with a minimum of
expense and bother." Payne, supra note 2, at 470.
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Bar Association v. Quinlan and Tyson, Inc.,18 that brokers may prepare
only certain preliminary documents. Of more import, however, was the
fact that the decision was a catalyst in the formulation of The Illinois Real
Estate Broker-Lawyer Accord,'4 which, in addition to delineating the
respective roles of the broker and the lawyer in real estate transactions,
provides a framework for settling future disputes. Implementation of
the Accord is, however, in its embryonic stage, and certain safeguards
can be built into it which would be beneficial to all concerned-brokers,
lawyers, courts, and the public. To that end, this comment is offered.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION TO PROTECT
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
In order to appreciate the distinctions between the concepts of "public
protection" and "public convenience," it is useful and necessary to briefly
trace the historical origins of "authorized" and "unauthorized" practice
of law. At first blush, it would seem that the very concept of unauthorized
practice of law a fortiori implies the existence of some concept of au-
thorized practice of law. Historically, however, the inverse of this simple
proposition proved true-practice of law became "authorized" because of
widespread evils which resulted from the unqualified, and therefore "un-
authorized," practice of law. As early as 468 A.D., unqualified prac-
tice necessitated a Roman statute prohibiting the practice of law by those
not authorized to so practice. 15 Over seven centuries later, the practice
of law began to develop in England when Henry II created a "Central
Court" which consisted of a selected, "small number of men who [were]
to do justice habitually."' 6  Only one century later, in 1292, because of
"a condition, intolerable to the king's people [that grew] up by the
promiscuous practice around the king's courts of persons unskilled in the
law . . . ,""17 Edward I was forced to limit the number of practitioners,
and in so doing, vested in the Court of Common Pleas the power to
appoint "attornies and lawyers of the best and most apt for their learning
and skill, who might do service to his court and people; . . . those so
chosen only, and no other [should practice]."' 8 Thus, as a result of
13. Supra note 11.
14. See Appendix A, infra.
15. POUND, THE LAWYERS FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 51 (1953). See
also State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., supra note 8.
16. I POLLACK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 133 (1st ed. 1895).
17. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 133, 179
A. 139, 143 (1935).
18. POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 194. See also HERBERT, ANTIQUITIES
OF THE INNS OF COURT AND CHANCERY 165-67 (1804).
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unauthorized practice of law, rather than as a cause, the 1292 ordinance
established the principle that law could be practiced only by those "author-
ized" to do so by the court.
It is important to determine that authorized practice came into being to
safeguard the public interest because the basic criticism through the cen-
turies of the very notion of "authorized" practice has been that those who
determine what is authorized, and thereby what is unauthorized, have too
great a personal stake in such determination. Although there undoubtedly
exists more than a scintilla of truth in that assertion, the idea that the
legal profession is a mercenary, monopolistic, self-serving entity, unre-
sponsive to the public interest and dispensing privileges only to a favored
few, has been consistently rejected by commentators and courts. Benja-
min Cardozo observed:
[One is] received into that ancient fellowship [i.e., the Bar] for something more
than a private gain. [The lawyer] becomes an officer of the court, and, like the
court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. 19
Wigmore stated: "The most important thing about the practice of law is
that it is, and in the inherent nature of things demands always that it shall
be, a profession."'20 A "profession," said Roscoe Pound, is "a group of men
pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a public service
-no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."'21 That "spirit of public service" is a "prerequisite of sound
administration of justice according to law." 2  Courts have also accepted
this reasoning.23
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PUBLIC FOR THE GROWTH OF UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE
Once authorized practice came into being to protect the public, and un-
authorized practice became punishable, one might believe that authorized
practice, which is deserving of independent existence, would pre-empt
the growth of unauthorized practice. Human experience, however, dic-
tates that what ought to be is not necessarily what is. Unauthorized prac-
19. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928). See also
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, supra note 17, at 133-34, 179
A. at 146; In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899).
20. POUND, supra note 15, at 353.
21. POUND, supra note 15, at 5 (emphasis added).
22. POUND, supra note 15, at 10.
23. See People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919). "The reason
why preparatory study, educational qualifications, experience, examination and li-
cense by the courts are required, is not to protect the bar .. . but to protect the
public." Id. at 339, 125 N.E. at 673. See also Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan &
Tyson, Inc., supra note 8.
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tice, like a parasite, attached and fed upon authorized practice and has to
a greater or lesser degree experienced a parallel growth. The need for
public protection has been continually tempered by the attitude of the
public that "anything you (lawyers) can do, I (the public) can do better."
That the 1292 ordinance of Edward I did not check the growth of un-
authorized practice is evidenced by the extensive body of legislation and
case law which has developed since, and continues today. 24
It is ironic that primary responsibility for allowing the growth of un-
authorized practice must fall upon the public-the same public whose
interest was to be safeguarded by the legal profession and its authorized
practitioners. Growth of unauthorized practice has resulted both from
direct support by the public (use of lay practitioners) and from indirect
support (general public dissatisfaction with the legal system). This gen-
eral dissatisfaction, according to Pound, emanated from four general
sources:
(1) inevitable mechanistic operation of rules of law;
(2) inevitable difference in the rate of progress between law and public opinion;
(3) premise that the administration of justice is so simple that anyone is sufficiently
competent to engage in it;
(4) inherent human impatience of restraint. 2 5
Pound's latter two causes of dissatisfaction with the legal process have
played a substantial role in the broker-lawyer controversy. Brokers have
consistently claimed that conveyancing is such a simple matter that bro-
kers, with their specialized training, are clearly competent to prepare all
necessary documents. 20 They further assert that involving an additional
party in the title-transferring process (adding a lawyer where only the
buyer, seller and broker are necessary) is not only inconvenient and causes
delay, but also has a chilling effect on many transactions.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-GENERAL PROPOSITIONS
This brief historical discussion of the practice of law is offered to estab-
lish the proposition that the interplay of two divergent concepts governs
that which constitutes "authorized" or "unauthorized" practice at any
24. Later English statutes excluded certain individuals from practice in the pub-
lic interest-e.g., bailiffs, court clerks, sheriffs, etc. See 1 Henry V (1413); 33
Henry VI, c.7 (1455); 3 James I, c.7 (1606). For legislation concerning the un-
authorized practice of law in the United States see the UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
STATUTE BOOK (1st ed. 1961). For cases and secondary material concerning the
unauthorized practice of law see the UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE SOURCE BOOK (Bass
rev. ed. 1965).
25. POUND, supra note 15, at xxiv (Preface). A fifth factor which may be of
greater importance, practically speaking, than the other four is the cost factor.
26. See Nelson, supra note 5.
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given time in history: (1) public protection, on the one hand, necessitates
the continued growth of a learned, legal profession; (2) public con-
venience, on the other hand, dicates that it is often inconvenient and costly
to consult authorized practitioners on all matters concerning legal re-
lations. In order to make a determination that certain activities constitute
unauthorized practice of law, the courts must necessarily weigh the re-
spective merits of these concepts.
Several subsidiary propositions concerning the unauthorized practice of
law also emerge: (1) The public did not as much demand protection as
protection was imposed upon them from a superior authority-historically,
the sovereign; (2) the courts were invested with the power to authorize
practioners; and (3) the public has never been wholly satisfied with the
legal system, thereby supporting unauthorized practice of law. Each of
these premises plays a significant role in the broker-lawyer conveyancing
controversy, and any solution to the problem must recognize and take
advantage of these historical implications.
ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER PRACTICE OF LAW
JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW
With few exceptions, American courts have held that the judiciary has
absolute power to determine who shall be authorized to practice law. 27
Such plenary power over admissions to the practice of law derives from
either, or both, of two sources: the doctrine of inherent power of the
common law judiciary, and the doctrine of separation of powers. Al-
though related, the two concepts are distinguishable; yet courts consistently
confuse or fail to differentiate between them.
The inherent power concept has obscure origins. One line of thought
theorizes that the common law courts were necessarily forced to undertake
numerous powers ancillary to their adjudicative functions 28 so as "to fill
27. See, e.g., State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., supra
note 8; In re Day, supra note 19; In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194
N.E. 313 (1935); Hulse v. Criger, supra note 10. See also Cheadle, Inherent
Power of the Judiciary Over Admittance to the Bar, 7 WASH. L. REV. 318 (1932);
Lee, The Constitutional Power of the Courts Over Admission to the Bar, 13 HARv.
L. REV. 233 (1924). The states which recognize legislative supremacy over ad-
missions are Maryland, New York, North Carolina and Vermont. See Bastian v.
Watkins, 230 Md. 325, 187 A.2d 304 (1963); In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860);
In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 31, 55 S.E. 635 (1906); Button v. Day, 204
Va. 547, 132 S.E.2d 292 (1963). For majority and minority holdings, see Payne,
Title Insurance, The Legislatures and the Constitution, 21 ALA. L. REV. 25 (1968).
28. Such as "regulating procedure, providing for judicial personnel and quarters,
maintaining order during court proceedings, and enforcing decrees." Payne, supra
note 27, at 37.
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a legal vacuum" created by the non-assertion of regulatory power vested
in but unexercised by the crown or Parliament.29  Thus, as a "result
of improvisation [rather] than design," the judiciary filled the need for
regulation.80 Once the power was exercised over a period of time, as in
the case of admissions to practice, the courts then relied upon "immemorial
custom" to sustain such exercise.8 '
A second theory traces the origins of inherent power to express grants
of authority from the crown or Parliament, rather than to necessity. A
strong argument can be offered that "inherent" judicial control over ad-
mission to the practice of law stemmed from such grants. The 1292
ordinance of Edward I provided that the Court of Common Pleas was to
appoint qualified "attornies and lawyers . . . who might do service to
his court and people .... -32 Subsequent legislation on the matter of
admissions had a dual effect. While it ostensibly set minimum standards
or excluded persons unfit to practice, it also directly or indirectly reaffirmed
the premise that ultimate control over admissions rested in the judiciary. 3
The courts continued to exercise such power. Therefore, because of the
express grant, reaffirmations and "immemorial custom," the judiciary,
ipso facto, had inherent power to control admissions to practice.
From the standpoint of the history of the American judiciary, the doc-
trine of separation of powers has played an important role in the determi-
nation that the courts have plenary power to control admittance to the
practice of law. Simply stated, the separation theory provides that:
[AII the powers intrusted to government, whether state or national, are divided
into the three grand departments, the executive, the legislative and the judicial....
[T]he functions appropriate to each of these branches of government shall be vested
in a separate body of public servants .... [Whomsoever is] intrusted with power
in any one of these branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers
confided to the others . . . . E]ach shall by the law of its creation be limited to
the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other.8 4
Although the constitutions of only a few states expressly grant the judiciary
29. Payne, supra note 27, at 36.
30. Payne, supra note 27, at 36.
31. Payne, supra note 27, at 36.
32. POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 194. "[Tlhe object of this first
attempt at regulating the bar was the well-being of government and people [and]
the duty of bringing that about was expressly charged upon the justices." Rhode
Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, supra note 17, at 133, 179 A. at 143.
33. See, e.g., I Henry V (1413); 33 Henry VI, c.7 (1455); 3 James I, c.7(1606). See generally In re Day, supra note 19, at 85, 54 N.E. at 649. "[T]he
legislation was of a character to exclude persons unfit to practice, who threatened the
public welfare through ignorance or untrustworthiness." See also Rhode Island Bar
Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, supra note 17.
34. Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880) (emphasis added).
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the power to control admissions, 5 the majority of state courts imply such
plenary control from the grant of the whole judicial power to the judicial
department. A leading decision on unauthorized practice expressed this
view:
[Tihe grant of the judicial power to the department created for the purpose of
exercising it must be regarded as an exclusive grant covering the whole power,
subject only to the limitations which the constitutions impose .... 36
In commenting upon the rationale for such an implication, the Illinois
Supreme Court demonstrated that it relied both upon the concept of "in-
herent power" of the judiciary as well as upon the doctrine of "separation
of powers:"
That power [to pass upon learning and fitness to practice law] belongs to the
court by virtue of its being a court of justice and one of the departments of state
into which, under the constitution, the power falls. Without such power, by which
the courts can protect themselves against ignorance and want of skill, they cannot
properly administer justice.37
IMPLIED JUDICIAL POWER TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
Once the courts asserted their inherent power over admissions, whether
justifiably or otherwise, the inference process had to be carried one step
further. Inferred from the power to admit to or exclude from practice
was implied power to prevent unauthorized practice,38 usually by injunc-
tion"9 and contempt 40 proceedings. The rationale underlying the power
35. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 28; FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 23; N.J. CONST. art.
6, § 2 (3).
36. In re Day, supra note 19, at 83, 54 N.E. at 648.
37. In re Day, supra note 19, at 94, 54 N.E. at 652 (emphasis added).
38. See Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,
176 N.E. 901 (1931); In re Opinion of the Justices, supra note 27; In re Opinion of
the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Auto-
mobile Service Ass'n, supra note 17; Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington
Ass'n of Realtors, supra note 11; In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 A. 550 (1924).
39. See Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note
10; Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N.E.2d 264
(1945): "Surely the courts are not impotent to protect those to whom the right to
practice law has been granted from the natural and necessary results of the unau-
thorized exercise of those rights by others, whether they be corporations or in-
dividuals." Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 34, 193
N.E. 650, 655 (1934); see Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of
Realtors, supra note 11.
40. See Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941, cert. denied,
302 U.S. 728 (1937); Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank,
supra note 38; Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, supra note 17;
In re Welch, 128 Vt. 180, 185 A.2d 458 (1962); In re Morse, supra note 38; But cf.
Indianapolis Bar Ass'n v. Fletcher Trust Co., 211 Ind. 27, 5 N.E.2d 538 (1937);
Murphy v. Townley, 67 N.D. 560, 274 N.W. 857 (1937).
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to prevent unauthorized practice was expressed by the Illinois Supreme
Court:
[Having inherent power to control admissions] it necessarily follows that this court
has the power to enforce its rules and decisions against offenders, even though they
have never been licensed by this court. Of what avail is the power to license in the
absence of power to prevent one not licensed from practicing as an attorney?
In the absence [of such power] the power to control admissions would be nugatory. 41
The weight of authority supports the premise that the judiciary may pun-
ish unauthorized practice 42 irrespective of statutory penalties which are
generally construed as non-exclusive. 43
IMPLICATIONS OF ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER PRACTICE OF LAW
Whether absolute judicial control over the practice of law derives
from common law "necessity" or "express grant" origins, or from the doc-
trine of separation of powers, has become unimportant today. It is now
axiomatic that the judiciary has such plenary power. This view of ju-
dicial supremacy represents the great weight of authority.44  An im-
portant corollary to this proposition has also emerged: legislation con-
cerning the practice of law can set minimum standards for authorization,
but such legislation can be, at most, of an advisory nature; it cannot usurp
or infringe upon the absolute control vested in the judiciary. 45 The inter-
relationship of these two propositions offers a flexibility which can be
effectively utilized in the formulation of an ideal solution to the broker-
lawyer conveyancing problem.
46
CONVEYANCING-THE ROLE OF THE REAL ESTATE BROKER
CONVEYANCIN--PRACTICE OF LAW?
Judicial attempts to define the nebulous concept of "practice of law"
have been uniformly unsuccessful in their failure to delineate any prac-
ticable boundaries to the term. Most definitions are all-encompassing in
their implications:
"Practice of law" [is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but also] in-
41. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, supra note 38, at
471-72, 176 N.E. at 906 (emphasis added).
42. See In re Day, supra note 19; In re Opinion of the Justices, supra note 27;
In re Morse, supra note 38.
43. See supra note 33, and accompanying text.
44. See Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. supra note 8; In re Day,
supra note 19; In re Opinion of the Justices, supra note 27; Washington State Bar
Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, supra note 11.
45. See supra note 33, and accompanying text.
46. See text infra pages 335-43.
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cludes legal advice and counsel, as to the preparation of legal instruments and con-
tracts by which legal rights are secured . . .4
A literal interpretation of such a broad definition would leave virtually
no commercial area of human endeavor untouched. The necessity of
including certain out-of-court activities within the concept of practice of
law has a sound underlying rationale: whereas in-court mistakes are
capable, in many instances, of being corrected by the court, "[i]gnorance
and stupidity [in out-of-court matters] may . . . create damage which
the courts of the land cannot thereafter undo. '48  It is in making deter-
minations of which out-of-court activities constitute practice of law that
courts must weight the respective merits of the "public protection" and
"public convenience" concepts.
Conveyancing-"[a] term including both the science and art of trans-
ferring titles to real estate from one man to another" 49-is an out-of-court
activity which has caused courts great difficulty. The most often cited
definitions of practice of law specifically include conveyancing:
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice in a large variety of subjects,
and the preparation and execution of legal instruments . . . . These "customary
functions of an attorney or counsellor at law" . . . bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction . . . can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments. . . .50
Such definitions seemingly exclude the real estate broker from any partici-
pation in the conveyancing process since preparation of any necessary
documents would constitute practice of law. Many courts, however,
qualify such definitions and allow drafting of "simple" instruments under
certain conditions: "The occasional drafting of simple deeds, and other
47. Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N.E. 836, 837 (1893). Accord, Illinois
State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, supra note 38; In re Gore, 58
Ohio App. 79, 15 N.E.2d 968 (1937); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service
Ass'n, supra note 17; In re Opinion of the Justices, supra note 27; Matter of Dun-
can, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E. 210 (1909).
48. People v. Alfani, supra note 23, at 340, 125 N.E. at 673 (emphasis added).
See also Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, supra note 38,
at 473, 176 N.E. at 906: "It is just as essential to the administration of justice
and the proper protection of society that unlicensed individuals should not be
permitted to prey upon the public in that sphere [out-of-court] as it is with respect to
procedings in the court."
49. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (4th ed. 1951).
50. In re Opinion of the Justices, supra note 27, at 613-14, 194 N.E. at 317
(emphasis added); Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank,
supra note 38; Eley v. Miller, supra note 47; Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile
Service Ass'n, supra note 17; accord, Matter of Duncan, supra note 47.
legal instruments when not conducted as an occupation or yielding sub-
stantial income may fall outside the practice of law."51  Confusion ob-
viously results from such conflicting statements. It is understandable
that courts have taken different views as to whether or not preparation of
necessary conveyancing documents constitutes practice of law.
WHAT CONVEYANCING DOCUMENTS MAY BE PREPARED BY REAL ESTATE
BROKERS?
The result of the delicate balancing process ultimately involves the
policy determination of what documents the broker may or may not pre-
pare. Three general solutions to the document problem have emerged: (1)
the broker may prepare virtually all documents 52 (emphasis on public con-
venience); (2) the broker may prepare no documents5 3 (emphasis
on public protection); (3) the broker may prepare some documents 54
(compromise between protection and convenience).
All Documents
The courts which have held that real estate brokers may prepare virtually
all documents involved in the conveyancing process have asserted, either
impliedly or expressly, that the underlying rationale of such a determination
is that public convenience outweighs the need for public protection:
The line between what is and what is not the practice of law cannot be drawn with
precision. Lawyers should be the first to recognize that between the two there is a
region wherein much of what lawyers do every day in their practice may also be done
by others without wrongful invasion of the lawyers' field. [O]rdinary conveyancing,
part of the everyday business of the realtor, is within that region and consequently
something of which the legal profession cannot under present circumstances claim
that the public welfare requires restraint by judicial decree. . . . We do not think
the possible harm which might come to the public from the rare instances of de-fective conveyances in such transactions is sufficient to outweigh the great public
51. In re Opinion of the Justices, supra note 27, at 615, 194 N.E. at 317 (em-
phasis added).
52. See Creekmore v. Izard, supra note 10; Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co.
v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 10; In re Matthews, supra note 10; State v. Indiana
Real Estate Ass'n, Inc., supra note 10; Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller
Co., supra note 10; State Bar of Michigan v. Kupris, supra note 10; Hulse v. Criger,
supra note 10; Cowern v. Nelson, supra note 10; State v. Dinger, supra note 10.
See also Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 788 (1957).
53. See State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., supra note 8;
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8. See also Annot.
53 A.L.R.2d 788 (1957).
54. See Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 11; Gustafson v.
V.C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., supra note 11; see also Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 788 (1957);
Commonwealth v. Jones & Robbins, Inc., supra note 11; Washington State Bar
Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, supra note 11.
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inconvenience which would follow if it were necessary to call in a lawyer to
draft these simple instruments.55
In arriving at such a finding, the courts first affirm their inherent power
over practice of law,56 state that practice of law includes both in-court
and some out-of-court activities,57 and hold that legislative enactments
are, at most, advisory and do not bind the judiciary.58 Several factors
influence the court decision: that preparation of the documents was inci-
dental to the brokerage business;59 that legal advice was not given;60
that the document was "simple" rather than "complex;"8 1 that no com-
pensation was received other than receipt of the regular brokerage fee;
6 2
that the broker was licensed; 68 and that it was customary in the community
that the broker prepare such documents.
64
After weighing all factors, these courts agree only that all necessary
55. Cowern v. Nelson, supra note 10, at 646-7, 290 N.W. at 797 (emphasis
added). See also Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 10;
Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., supra note 10; Hulse v. Criger,
supra note 10; State v. Dinger, supra note 10.
56. See Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 10;
State Bar of Michigan v. Kupris, supra note 10; Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter
Neller Co., supra note 10; Cowern v. Nelson, supra note 10; Hulse v. Criger, supra;
note 10; State v. Dinger, supra note 10.
57. See Creekmore v. Izard, supra note 10; In re Matthews, supra note 10;
Hulse v. Criger, supra note 10.
58. See Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 10;
Cowern v. Nelson, supra note 10; Hulse v. Criger, supra note 10; State v. Dinger,
supra note 10.
59. This generally means that since a broker is licensed to negotiate sales, he
therefore may prepare the documents necessary to consummate such sales. See
generally Creekmore v. Izard, supra note 10; Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Den-
ver Bar Ass'n, supra note 10; State Bar of Michigan v. Kupris, supra note 10;
Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., supra note 10; Cowern v. Nelson,
supra note 10; Hulse v. Criger, supra note 10.
60. See In re Matthews, supra note 10; State Bar of Michigan v. Kupris, supra
note 10; Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., supra note 10; Cowern v.
Nelson, supra note 10; Hulse v. Criger, supra note 10.
61. See Creekmore v. Izard, supra note 10; Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v.
Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 10; In re Matthews, supra note 10; Ingham County Bar
Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., supra note 10; Cowern v. Nelson, supra note 10;
Hulse v. Criger, supra note 10; State v. Dinger, supra note 10.
62. See Creekmore v. Izard, supra note 10; Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v.
Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 10; Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co.,
supra note 10; Cowern v. Nelson, supra note 10; Hulse v. Criger, supra note 10.
But cf. In re Mathews, supra note 10.
63. See Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 10;
State v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, Inc., supra note 10; State Bar of Michigan v.
Kupris, supra note 10; Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., supra note
10; State v. Dinger, supra note 10.
64. See Creekmore v. Izard, supra note 10; Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v.
Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 10; Hulse v. Criger, supra note 10.
documents may be prepared by the broker. They do not agree whether
or not such preparation constitutes the practice of law. Some expressly
state that such preparation is not the practice of law;65 other jurisdictions
hold that such preparation is the practice of law, but it is not unauthor-
ized;66 and others hold that preparation is not the unauthorized practice
of law,6 7 which means that preparation may or may not be practice of law.
No Documents
The courts which have held that the real estate broker may prepare
none of the documents involved in the conveyancing process stress the
element of public protection. 8 The main factors which other courts rely
on in finding that the preparation of certain documents does not constitute
the unauthorized practice of law are systematically criticized as fol-
lows: (1) incident of lawful, licensed business-"Centering the decision
. . . on a definition of what is incident to the defendant's business is
merely the reverse of centering it on a definition of what is the practice of
law," 69 and ignores the public interest.
Any rule which holds that a layman who prepares legal papers . . . is not practicing
law when such services are incidental to another business . . . completely ignores
the public welfare. 70
The mere fact that the broker is licensed to carry on certain activities
(i.e., sales of realty, etc.) does not allow him to carry on an activity
for which he is not licensed (i.e., practice of law); (2) simple instrument
-There exists no valid distinction between "simple" and "complex" docu-
ments where real estate is involved. "A document is simple or complex
relative to who prepares it . . 'The most complex [is] simple to the
skilled and the simplest often trouble[s] the inexperienced;' "71 (3) no
65. See In re Matthews, supra note 10; State v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, Inc.,
supra note 10; State Bar of Michigan v. Kupris, supra note 10; Ingham County Bar
Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., supra note 10.
66. See Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 10;
State v. Dinger, supra note 10.
67. See Creekmore v. Izard, supra note 10; Cowern v. Nelson, supra note 10;
Hulse v. Criger, supra note 10.
68. "The public interest must be the guiding principle for the court in deciding
this case ...... Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 394,
203 N.E.2d at 135. See also State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust
Co., supra note 8.
69. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 395, 203 N.E.
2d at 135-36.
70. State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., supra note 8, at 91,
366 P.2d at 12, citing Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 817, 273 P.2d 619,
625 (1954).
71. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 406, 203
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compensation-"This contention [that failure to charge for the prepara-
tion of various legal documents removes such preparation from the field
of the practice of law] is specious, since receipt of compensation is not
the feature which determines whether a given act is the practice of law."
72
"The need for protection of the public interest is the same whether
the broker's services are paid for or gratuitous; '78 (4) custom-
The fact that these practices have continued for many years and have been acquiesced
in by the bar does not make such activities any less the practice of law ...
[N]either the public's blissful acquiescence nor the bar's confessed lethargy can
clothe the activities with validity. There is no prescriptive right to practice
law .... 7 4
From the standpoint of absolute public protection, the arguments of the
courts which allow preparation of no documents by brokers are very log-
ical. However, they ignore one basic historical principle-that the public
wants absolute protection, but does not want to pay for it. This basic
proposition has influenced most courts to accept some broker-lawyer
compromise.
Some Documents
The courts which permit the real estate broker to prepare some of the
documents involved in the conveyancing process have accepted the propo-
sition that some broker-lawyer compromise is necessary:
As a practical solution . . . it [is] advisable to permit a real estate broker to pre-
pare simple contracts of sale, options, leases, etc., and to prohibit him from pre-
paring legal instruments whereby the legal title to property passes from the seller
to the purchaser. 75
The documents which may be prepared by the broker, however, are
generally of a preliminary nature-"offers to purchase," "options," "ear-
nest money receipts," or "binders." The rationale underlying the de-
cision prohibiting the broker from preparing certain subsequent documents
and instruments is similar to the rationale expressed by the courts which
prohibit the broker from preparing any documents:76 (1) preparation of
N.E.2d at 140, citing Justice Culbert Pound in People v. Title Guar. & Trust Co.,
227 N.Y. 366, 379, 125 N.E. 666, 670 (1919).
72. State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., supra note 8, at 87,
366 P.2d at 9.
73. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 410, 203
N.E.2d at 142 (emphasis added).
74. State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., supra note 8, at
93, 366 P.2d at 13 (emphasis added).
75. Commonwealth v. Jones & Robbins, Inc., supra note 11, at 727. See also
Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, supra note 11; Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan
& Tyson, Inc., supra note 11; Gustafson v. V.C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., supra note 11;
Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, supra note 11.
76. See supra notes 59-64 and 69-74 and accompanying text.
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subsequent documents is not incidental to the business of selling or buying
real estate; (2) these documents are not simple; (3) the character of the
act and not whether compensation is received governs; and (4) the fact
that brokers may have customarily prepared such documents is irrelevant
if the public welfare demands otherwise.
Rather than accepting the fact of compromise necessitated by public
convenience considerations, the courts attempt to rationalize the distinction
they make between permitting the broker to prepare preliminary binding
contracts and prohibiting him from preparing subsequent conveyancing
documents. In permitting preparation of preliminary documents, most
courts rely upon similar factors which dictate an opposite result when
applied to the subsequent documents: (1) The broker is licensed to
negotiate sales and purchases of real estate, and as an incident of his
business, he may therefore prepare these preliminary documents; (2) the
preliminary documents are generally standardized, "simple" forms orig-
inally prepared by a lawyer; (3) the broker receives no compensation
other than his brokerage fee; (4) brokers have customarily prepared such
documents; (5) selection of such standard forms does not constitute
the giving of legal advice; and (6) the broker is merely supplying factual
data, filling in the blanks, and making additions and deletions to the
contract as called for by the buyer or seller.
The attempt by the courts to rationalize the distinction between "pre-
liminary" and "subsequent" documents is somewhat illogical in that it
ignores the basic fact that the content of the latter is controlled by the
former:
[The contract between the parties is the fundamental instrument in a real estate
transaction and determines their future rights and obligations. It seems ...some-
what anomalous to permit the broker to prepare the controlling agreement but not
those [subsequent documents) which it controls.77
In reply to this argument, the courts further distinguish the subsequent
documents as being more than mere contracts-they are "extraordinary
contracts" which are "muniments of title. ' 78  Therefore, since many sub-
sequent documents are recorded, it is more important that they be pre-
pared by those most able to do so. Although this "recording argument"
does benefit the public to the extent that it maximizes the probability that
they will receive title to the property, it ignores the fact that perhaps more
actual damage results to the buyer at the bargaining stage when the pre-
77. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 11, at 124, 214
N.E.2d at 776 (dissenting opinion).
78. Commonwealth v. Jones & Robbins, Inc., supra note 11, at 36, 415 S.E.2d
at 727.
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liminary, binding contract is drawn by the broker, who is theoretically
acting as agent for the seller.
Another sound argument offered by the courts as justification for making
the distinction between preliminary and subsequent documents concerns
the broker's commission. He is generally entitled to a commission when
he brings together a ready, willing and able buyer and seller:
[Ilt seems logical and fair that the realtor be restricted in the drafting of papers to
those, such as a memorandum, deposit receipt, or the contract ... recording his
handiwork-that is, the bringing together of buyer and seller . . . . Once this
point is reached [and he is entitled to compensation] the field is the lawyers . . .79
THE ILLINOIS SOLUTION
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Illinois courts have been among the majority in asserting their plenary
control over admissions to the practice of law, 80 relying both upon the
doctrine of separation of powers and the doctrine of inherent judicial
power.8l Implicit in such power over admissions is the power and "duty
to punish those who seek to practice law without the authorization of the
judicial department, '82 notwithstanding any statutory penalties for un-
authorized practice.83 Power to punish unauthorized practice extends to
out-of-court practice as well as in-court activities; the public interest
governs what activities constitute unauthorized practice, not where the
act took place. 4 Indeed, the purpose underlying prohibition of un-
authorized practice is to protect the public, not to perpetuate a self-serving
legal profession:
In modem times the affairs of the people requiring the services of a lawyer have
become more intricate and complex, demanding a corresponding increase in the
standards of the profession through preliminary education and a lengthened and
more diversified course of study by those who would engage in the practice ....
79. Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, supra note 11, at 606.
80. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8; See In re Day,
supra note 19.
81. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
82. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 394, 203 N.E.2d
at 135. See also Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, supra
note 38.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, § I, as amended March 5, 1965 (Supp. 1969): "No
person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor at law within this
State without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from the Supreme
Court of this State. . . . Any person practicing, charging or receiving fees for legal
services within this State ...without being licensed to practice as herein required,
is guilty of contempt of court ...."
84. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 394, 203 N.E.2d
at 135. See also Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 111. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693 (1948).
These prerequisites are not for the purpose of creating a monopoly in the legal
profession nor for its protection, but for the better security of the people against
incompetency and dishonesty.8
5
Whether or not broker participation in the conveyancing process was
one of those out-of-court activities by a layman which constituted the
unauthorized practice of law did not confront the Illinois Supreme Court
until 1949. In that year, in People v. Schafer,80 the Illinois Bar Asso-
ciation brought an action against a licensed real estate broker seeking to
enjoin him from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, and to have
him found in contempt of court for carrying on certain activities. The
activities complained of included preparation of contracts, mortgages and
deeds; no fee was charged when Schafer was the broker in the transac-
tion, but an additional fee was charged when he was not the broker in the
transaction, but merely one who filled in necessary documents. In find-
ing the defendant guilty of contempt for engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law, the court rejected the argument that preparation of such
documents was a necessary incident of the real estate business, and the
mere filling in of blanks in "simple" instruments did not constitute prac-
tice of law:
One who merely fills in certain blanks [in deeds, notes, mortgages and contracts]
when other pertinent information should be elicited and considered is rendering
little service but is acting in a manner calculated to produce trouble. When
filling in blanks as directed he may not by that simple act be practicing law but if he
elicits the proper information and considers it and advises and acts thereon he
would in all probability be practicing law. In other words, if his service does not
amount to the practice of law it is without material value; but if it is of material
value it would likely amount to the practice of law.8 7
THE QUINLAN & TYSON CASE
Although the Schafer case seemed to prohibit real estate brokers from
preparing any of the necessary documents involved in the conveyancing
process, the brokers continued to prepare such documents. Finally, in
1957, the Chicago Bar Association filed suit against Quinlan & Tyson,
Inc., a reputable real estate brokerage firm which prepared all documents
involved in the title-transferring process-from the preliminary contract to
deeds of conveyance. The trial court referred the matter to a Master in
Chancery who heard extensive testimony, and who concluded that
preparation of all conveyancing instruments constituted the unauthorized
practice of law. The Chancellor modified the Master's findings to the
85. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 394, 203 N.E.2d
at 135 (emphasis added). See also supra note 40.
86. 404 I1. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949).
87. Id. at 53-54, 87 N.E.2d 777-78 (emphasis added).
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extent that the broker should be allowed to prepare preliminary contracts
of sale:
"As a necessary incident to the transaction of its real estate brokerage business the
[broker] when [he] is engaged as a broker by either the seller or the buyer of real
estate may prepare offers and contracts to purchase or sell under the following con-
ditions" (a) The contracts to be filled in are contracts customarily used in the
broker's community; (b) No additions are made in the form except those commonly
made in supplying factual and business details pertinent to the transaction; no de-
letions are made in the form except those involving the elimination of factual and
business details not pertinent to the transaction.88
The trial court thus determined that the convenience afforded to the
public outweighed the need for public protection, at least insofar as the
preparation of preliminary contracts by brokers was concerned.
On appeal,89 the trial court decision was affirmed in part and reversed
in part. The Chancellor's finding that preparation of documents subse-
quent to the offer to purchase constituted the unauthorized practice of law
was affirmed, but the finding that preparation of the offer to purchase was
not unauthorized was reversed. In a decision which emphasizes the need
for public protection in conveyancing matters,90 the Illinois appellate court
rejected all traditional arguments made on behalf of the broker: (1) inci-
dent to licensed business; 91 (2) no additional compensation; 92 (3) simple
document;93 (4) custom;9 4 (5) necessity of a writing to evidence the
88. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 391-92, 203
N.E.2d at 133 (emphasis added).
89. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8.
90. See also State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., supra note
8.
91. "We cannot adopt this 'incident to business' rule . . . . [It] is an evasion
of the hard core principle of the public interest which must be the basis for deciding
whether or not the defendant's actions constitute the practice of law. . . Center-
ing the decision of this case on a definition of what is incident to the [broker's]
business is merely the reverse of centering it on a definition of what is the practice
of law. To take an approach to this case on either basis without considering where
the public interest lies is . . objectionable." Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson,
Inc., supra note 8, at 395, 203 N.E.2d at 140.
92. "The character of the act and not whether compensation is or is not re-
ceved is determinative. The need for protection of the public interest is the
same whether the broker's services are paid for or gratuitous." Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 409-10, 203 N.E.2d at 142.
93. "[A] document is simple or complex relative to who prepares it ....
Moreover, it is apparent that the simplicity or complexity of a document also de-
pends on the social and legal context into which it is placed. Hence the preparation
of a real estate sales contract is simple enough when the instrument is viewed merely
as a memorandum of the agreement as to the terms of a transfer of ownership of
real estate. But the contract cannot realistically be viewed in such isolation. The
one who prepares the contract must keep in mind the law of marriage or divorce,
probate, heirship, landlord and tenant, vendor and purchaser and many other
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bringing together of a ready, willing and able buyer and seller. 95
The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the finding of the trial court-
the brokers were permitted "to fill in the blanks of whatever form of
such contract is customarily used in the community and to make appro-
priate deletions from such contract to conform to the facts,"'96 but were
prohibited from preparing subsequent documents. The articulated ration-
ale was that since a broker is licensed to find a ready, willing and able
buyer, and he earns his commission at that point, he should therefore be
allowed to evidence his performance by such a writing. However, there is
an inarticulated rationale for the decision-a broker-lawyer compromise
is acceptable because the need for public protection is considerably tem-
pered by the public demand for convenience.
THE ILLINOIS REAL ESTATE BROKER-LAWYER ACCORD
Perhaps more important than the Quinlan & Tyson decision itself was the
subsequent formulation of the Illinois Real Estate Broker-Lawyer Ac-
cord.97 The Accord was necessary because after the appellate court de-
cision which held that brokers could prepare no documents, "a real Donny-
brook was developing."98 Two bills were introduced into the 1965 Gen-
eral Assembly which would have nullified the appellate holding, and
"there was even talk of sponsoring a constitutional amendment [allowing
brokers to prepare certain documents] if the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
... ."9 Such public controversy between brokers and lawyers could
not benefit either profession, or the public, as evidenced by a similar
branches of the law as they relate to each other and to the real estate sales con-
tract." Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 406-07, 203
N.E.2d at 142.
94. "Even though we grant the existence of the customs and practices ...we
find no greater reason for believing that the customs arose because the public gen-
erally approved them, as consistent with the public interest, than for believing that
it arose because of a lack of awareness by some people of the legal consequences of
their acts and of the advantages in retaining a lawyer." Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 411-12, 203 N.E.2d at 143.
95. 'The broker becomes entitled to a commission from the seller at the time
he finds a buyer ready, willing and able to enter into an agreement on the seller's
terms. It is not essential in Illinois that an executed written agreement actually be
entered into. The seller becomes bound at the moment that his terms have been
met." Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 8, at 412, 203 N.E.2d
at 143 (emphasis added).
96. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., supra note 11, at 120, 214 N.E.
2d at 774.
97. Reprinted in full in Appendix A, infra.
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problem in Arizona. 100 A special committee of brokers and lawyers was
therefore appointed in 1965 to implement the appellate decision. The
Supreme Court ruling allowing brokers to fill in preliminary contracts was
of great assistance. In so finding, the court recognized that a broker-
lawyer compromise was necessary. Based upon that premise, the logical
place to restrict broker activity was after a preliminary contract was
signed. This was beneficial to the broker in that he could then evidence
the bringing together of a ready, willing and able buyer and seller, and
it was also beneficial to the lawyer in that he was also assured a role in
the conveyancing process. The Accord was formulated in 1966, shortly
after the Supreme Court ruling.
The importance of the "truce" between the brokers and the lawyers
in the form of the Accord cannot be underestimated-it represents not
only an effort to protect their own professional reputations, but also repre-
sents an effort by both to recognize wherein the public interest lies. 10
In defining the respective roles that brokers and lawyers are to play in
the conveyancing process, 0 2 and in providing a framework within which
disputes can be settled by a decision-making body consisting of represen-
tatives of each interest group, 103 the brokers, the lawyers, the courts and
the public all stand to be benefitted.
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE BROKER-LAWYER ACCORD
Although the Illinois Real Estate Broker-Lawyer Accord and the con-
100. After the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that real estate brokers could not
prepare any documents involved in the conveyancing process, State Bar of Arizona v.
Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., supra note 8, an open "war" between brokers and
lawyers resulted. A constitutional amendment was offered to circumvent the su-
preme court ruling, and after a campaign in which "both professions suffered perma-
nent injury in the eyes of the public," the amendment passed. "Some idea of the
heat of that campaign was a slogan used, 'Protect your pocketbook. . . beat the law-
yers.'" Id., at n.l.
101. See ILLINOIS REAL ESTATE BROKER-LAWYER AccoRD Preamble (1966), Ap-
pendix A, infra.
102. In defining the respective roles, the traditional grievances of brokers and
lawyers vis-A-vis each other emerge. For example, the broker is not to give any
legal advice, or to "minimize the value of the lawyer's services" or refer customers
to one specific lawyer. And the lawyer is not to delay the transaction, or "mini-
mize the value of the broker's services" or "participate or attempt to participate in the
broker's commissions." Id. art. II, III. A previous attempt at defining the re-
spective roles of brokers and lawyers ended in a 1943 agreement between the Amer-
ican Bar Association and the National Association of Real Estate Boards which
contained some provisions similar to those in the AccoRD. See 3 MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL LAW DMECTORY 224A (1970).
103. The "Illinois Joint Real Estate Broker-Lawyer Committee" consists of
four realtors and four lawyers. Id. art. Ill.
tinuing organization created therein-the "Illinois Joint Real Estate Broker-
Lawyer Committee"-present a viable framework for settling future dis-
putes, there are areas in which improvement can be made. First, the
principles of the Accord should be made applicable to all real estate bro-
kers, rather than only to members of the real estate organizations which
were parties to the Accord. Secondly, attention should be focused on the
preliminary contract which the broker is allowed to prepare, and proper
safeguards should be inserted in the public interest. Finally, education
concerning the Accord and the nature of the preliminary contracts should
be improved.
Making the Principles of the Accord Applicable to all Brokers
Since the Illinois Supreme Court has followed the majority of jurisdic-
tions in asserting its inherent control over the authorized and unauthorized
practice of law, it has several practical alternatives. Under its own rule-
making power, the court could adopt the principles of the Accord and, in
the interest of the public, could make those principles applicable to all
brokers and lawyers. A second alternative would provide that the
Department of Registration and Education adopt the principles of the
Accord.10 4 Since all brokers are licensed by the Department, they would
thereby be bound by the principles of the Accord. Although the Depart-
ment is a creature of the legislature, the court could, consistent with its
interpretation of inherent powers, recognize this alternative as an aid to
the judiciary in carrying out its function.
From the standpoint of all concerned, perhaps the best solution to the
problem would involve the "Joint Real Estate Broker-Lawyer Committee."
By court rule, the Committee could continue to function as an advisory
body for the court. In order to enforce provisions of the Accord, the
Department of Registration and Education could make violation of the
Accord punishable by fine, and in the case of repeated offenders, violation
could constitute a ground for license revocation. In extreme cases, the
Committee could also seek to enjoin offenders and have them cited for
contempt. Such a solution benefits the brokers and lawyers in that the
initial decision maker-the Committee-consists of members of each
group. From there, for disciplinary matters, the offenders could be re-
ferred to their respective organizations-the Department of Registration
and Education or the bar associations. The courts would benefit by
having the Committee as an advisory body. Ultimately, of course, the
104. Orville Foreman, former member of the Broker-Lawyer Committee and one
of the participants in the original drafting of the AccoRD suggested this alternative
to this writer in a letter dated October 14, 1969.
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public would benefit from such a system because the controversy would
not be carried on in the press, and public confidence in attorneys would
not be shattered as was the case in Arizona.
The Preliminary Contract
Since brokers are allowed to fill out preliminary contracts of sale,
safeguards to protect the public interest should be inserted in such con-
tracts. One avowed function of the Committee is to formulate standard-
ized form contracts. 105 The mere fact of using standardized contracts is
beneficial to all parties concerned because constant use by lawyers and
brokers, and court constructions of the same documents will result in the
reduction of errors caused by the use of many documents having varied
terms and conditions. Whether one form or several are created, each
should contain certain warnings for the public. Initially, the title-
"OFFER TO PURCHASE"-is misleading to many laymen; some buyers do
not realize that upon acceptance of this offer, a binding contract is
formed. In order to avoid such a problem, the title should be-"coN-
TRACT OF SALE." The National Conference of Lawyers and Realtors re-
cently suggested a "Model Form" which contains a boldface heading to
avoid this problem-"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT: IF NOT
FULLY UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE! CONTRACT OF SALE." 1 06
A secondary proposition which many laymen fail to appreciate is that
the broker in almost every transaction is acting as agent for one prin-
cipal, usually the seller, and not as agent for both parties. Theoretically,
when the broker is making additions to and deletions from the preliminary
contract, he is acting on behalf of his principal. In order to warn the
other party of that relationship, the contract should note in boldface or
contrasting color that "BROKER REPRESENTS (BUYER) (SELLER) (strike
one)." This gives the other party another notice that if he needs advice
concerning the contract, he should consult a lawyer, rather than rely upon
the advice of the broker.
Another desirable feature which should be included on a contract of
sale is a brief marginal checklist of items customarily covered in a sale
contract. 107 For example, the list could include items the contract is
usually conditioned upon, such as sale of other property, rezoning, fi-
105. ILLINoIs REAL ESTATE BROKER-LAWYER ACCORD art. III § 3(e), see Ap-
pendix A, infra.
106. The "Model Form" is reprinted in UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS (Fall/
Winter 1968-69) at 57.
107. Such a checklist is provided on the standard "Offer to Purchase" forms used
in Wisconsin, and approved by the Wisconsin Real Estate Brokers' Board.
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nancing, etc. By listing these items in the margin, the possibility that the
buyer will inadvertently overlook an essential term is minimized.
Education
Education of the brokers, the lawyers and the public is essential to any
successful program aimed at bettering the existing conveyancing process.
The public should certainly be informed as to the content of the Accord,
and efforts should even be made to reach those brokers and lawyers un-
familiar with the Accord and its implications.108 Once standardized forms
are adopted, there should be education as to the import of the terms on the
contract. For example, most form contracts of sale list as a general lien
and encumbrance, any "restrictions, conditions or covenants of record."' 09
Brokers often leave such a phrase in the contract unless the buyer specifi-
cally requests its deletion. Often, neither the broker nor the buyer com-
prehend the extremely serious implications of such a phrase, but leave it
in the contract merely because it is printed there. Educating the broker
as to the implications of such a phrase is desirable. The obvious intent
of both buyer and seller in most instances is to convey title subject only
to those liens and encumbrances specifically listed and understood by
both parties. The broker should recognize this fact and make appropriate
deletions and factual insertions according to the circumstances. Educa-
tion as to these matters could be given through the respective bar associa-
tions, real estate associations, 1 0 the Broker-Lawyer Committee, l"' or the
Department of Registration and Education." 2
108. Frank A. Reichelderfer, Chairman of the "Joint Real Estate Broker-Lawyer
Committee," in a letter to this writer dated November 4, 1969 expressed this prob-
lem: "The committee feels that the improvement in the relationships between the
realtors and lawyers can best be accomplished by continued education of the prin-
ciples of the Accord. Most of the matters which come before the committee
involve acts by parties who are not familiar with the Accord and some are not
even familiar with the Quinlan & Tyson case." This is a problem which must be
remedied.
109. See examples of form contracts used in the Chicago area: e.g., George E.
Cole Legal Form No. 672, February, 1967; Anderson & Anderson Form No. 572-R,
revised 1966; Chicago Title and Trust Company Revised 1968 Form.
110. Although the bar associations and real estate associations, through con-
tinuing education seminars and trade publications, do reach certain members of the
professions, the people who most need the education are the least likely to partici-
pate in such programs or read such materials.
111. "[J]oint dissemination to brokers, lawyers and the public of information
on the conduct of real estate transactions" is another function of the Broker-Lawyer
Committee. ILLINoIs REAL ESTATE BROKER-LAWYER AccoRD art. III 3(f), see
Appendix A, infra.
112. The Department of Registration has the power to regulate the curriculum
of accredited real estate schools. Since many brokers attend these schools, it




A brief historical look at the background of practice of law demon-
strated that practice became "authorized" to protect the public from
unskilled, "unauthorized" practitioners. Notwithstanding this laudable
foundation of the legal profession, the public has always been dissatisfied
with the legal profession and the legal process. The basic reason
underlying this dissatisfaction has been inconvenience; the public is willing
to receive necessary protection, but is unwilling to pay for it-both in
terms of money and delay. Nowhere have these basic propositions been
more demonstrable than in the conveyancing process. For this reason, if
protection is to be afforded to the public, that protection must be im-
posed on the public from those interest groups most involved in the con-
veyancing process on a continuing basis-real estate brokers and lawyers.
Recognizing the basic historical problems, the courts must necessarily
accept some broker-lawyer compromise which allows the broker to prepare
a document which will evidence the bringing together of a ready, willing
and able buyer and seller. Working within such a compromise, the bro-
kers, the lawyers and the courts will be better able to focus attention on
the public interest. The courts can exercise their plenary power over the
practice of law as necessary, or can accept legislative assistance in carrying
out their inherent judicial function. 11 Such a system can benefit all parties
concerned-the brokers, the lawyers, the courts, and most importantly,
the public.
Karl L. Felbinger
standardized contract forms. See REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND SALESMEN LAw 3.01
(Supp. 1969).
113. One writer described this approach as "The court ... quietly sanction[ing]
a tenancy at sufferance on a parcel of its judicial domain." Note, Constitutional
Law-Wisconsin Supreme Court's Control of the Practice of Law and Conveyancing,
1962 Wis. L. REv. 366, 374.
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APPENDIX A
ILLINOIS REAL ESTATE
BROKER - LAWYER ACCORD
Preamble
WHEREAS, the public interest requires that the respective roles of real estate
brokers (hereinafter referred to as "brokers") and lawyers in a real estate transac-
tion be defined clearly and that brokers and lawyers in carrying out their respective
roles at all times proceed in accordance with their respective codes or canons of
ethics; and
WHEREAS, it is further desirable in the public interest that any disputes be-
tween brokers and lawyers as to their respective roles be reduced to a minimum
and that, should such disputes arise, some expeditious method of settlement thereof
be developed; and
WHEREAS, in the case of The Chicago Bar Association, et al. vs. Quinlan and
Tyson the Supreme Court of Illinois has determined what the broker may or may
not do in the consummation of a real estate sale; and
WHEREAS, nothing herein contained is designed to or does affect the right of a
party to a real estate transaction to act for himself in such transaction without
the services of a broker or a lawyer and it is not intended by this accord to either
modify or destroy such right; and
WHEREAS, nothing herein contained is designed to or does affect the right of
local bar associations and local real estate boards to continue recognition of
existing agreements between them, or to execute new agreements, when such agree-
ments are consistent with the principles herein contained; and
WHEREAS, committees of Illinois Association of Real Estate Boards, Chicago
Real Estate Board, The Chicago Bar Association, and Illinois State Bar Association
have considered all of the foregoing and have recommended this accord to their
respective organizations.
Now, THEREFORE, IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE I
The Broker
It is the function of the broker to bring the seller and buyer to agreement as to the
sale and purchase of a given parcel of real estate.
In order to accomplish this the broker should be governed by the following:
1. As stated by the Court in The Chicago Bar Association, et al. vs. Quinlan
and Tyson, he may complete the document referred to in that case as the preliminary
or earnest money contract, (hereinafter called "contract") which is customarily in
use in the community where the broker does business, by filling in only factual
and business details in blanks provided therefor. He may add to or delete from
such form only factual statements and business details, furnished by the principals
therein, the addition or deletion of which is necessary to conform to the particular
factual situation. He may not prepare or complete any document necessary to
carry out or implement the contract.
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2. Where it appears prior to the execution of the contract that there are unusual
matters involved in the transaction which should be resolved before a contract is
executed, the broker should advise the parties that each should consult a lawyer of
his choice before such contract is executed.
3. The broker may not give advice on any matter of law, either directly or
indirectly, but he should recommend that both the seller and the buyer consult their
respective lawyers as to all legal questions and for the preparation of all those docu-
ments which may be necessary to implement and carry out the contract.
4. Where either the seller or the buyer desires to see a lawyer prior to the
execution of a contract the broker should not attempt to dissuade such party from
legal consultation.
5. The broker should not minimize the value of the lawyer's services, or partici-
pate or attempt to participate in the lawyer's fees.
6. The broker may not directly or indirectly employ a lawyer or pay for
the services of a lawyer, to represent either the buyer or the seller.
7. A broker may refer a buyer or seller to a lawyer if asked to do so by such
buyer or seller but in such case the broker should give the party the names of not
less than three lawyers who are qualified to perform the legal services involved,
without indicating any preference as to any one of the three.
8. A broker should advise the parties that the contract is binding on them.
9. Where a broker is also a lawyer, he may not advertise that he can handle the
complete details of a real estate transaction including preparation of documents
other than the completion of the contract customarily used in the community, or that
he can handle the transaction cheaper or better because he is also a lawyer, nor
should he act as a lawyer for either the buyer or the seller in the same transac-
tion in which he is acting or has acted as the broker.
ARTICLE II
The Lawyer
It is the function of lawyers to give all legal advice required by the parties in a
real estate transaction and to prepare all the documents necessary to carry out the
contract. The lawyer may prepare the contract, if employed so to do by the
buyer, the seller or the broker.
In order to accomplish this function the lawyer should be governed by the follow-
ing:
1. The lawyer who is consulted by either the buyer or the seller shall use his
best efforts to proceed diligently to the conclusion of the transaction, and if his
work load does not permit a prompt conclusion of the same he should so state at
the time of employment.
2. The lawyer should not minimize the value of the broker's services, nor partici-
pate or attempt to participate in the broker's commissions.
3. The lawyer in representing the buyer or the seller in a real estate transaction
should not give his opinion on the physical condition or the market value of the real
estate involved in the transaction.
4. A lawyer may not accept employment by or compensation from the broker to
render services to either the buyer or the seller in the transaction, or to prepare
any documents which the broker is not himself authorized to prepare.
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5. It is the responsibility of the lawyer to prepare documents for a buyer or
seller which documents the broker is not himself authorized to prepare.
6. A lawyer may not represent more than one of the broker, buyer and
seller, in the same transaction except in those communities where the applicable
canons of ethics clearly permit representation of conflicting interests by a lawyer
after full and complete disclosure of the conflict of interest to the parties desiring
such representation and upon the express consent of the parties.
7. Where a lawyer also holds a broker's license he may not advertise that he
can handle a real estate transaction cheaper or better because he is a broker as well
as a lawyer nor may he act as a lawyer for the buyer and seller or either of
them in the same transaction where he is the broker, even though no charge be
made for his services as a lawyer.
ARTICLE l
Permanent Organization
1. There is hereby created a continuing organization which shall be designated
Illinois Joint Real Estate Broker-Lawyer Committee which shall be constituted,
and have the functions, as hereinafter in this Article set forth.
2. There shall be eight members of this committee, two from Illinois Association
of Real Estate Boards; two from the Chicago Real Estate Board, two from The
Chicago Bar Association and two from Illinois State Bar Association, who shall be
designated by each of said organizations in such manner as to the organization seems
desirable. The initial members shall be appointed one from each organization for
a term of one year and one for a term of two years. Annually thereafter one
shall be appointed from each organization for a two year term. Vacancies on the
Committee may be filled for the unexpired term by the organization which originally
appointed the member for whom such vacancy exists.
3. The Committee shall:
(a) At all times act in the interest of the public.
(b) Consider and promote such changes in procedure and in laws relative to
real estate transactions, while preserving the respective roles of the brokers and
lawyers, as will benefit the public, subject to the approval of the respective
organizations approving this instrument.
(c) Promote and encourage cordial relations between brokers and lawyers.
(d) Consider any controversies which may arise between brokers and law-
yers as may be referred to it, involving any alleged violations of the principles
set forth in Articles I and II, inclusive, and attempt to resolve the same.
In cases where there appears to have been violations of such principles by either
a broker or lawyer, and the resultant controversy cannot be resolved by the Com-
mittee, it may refer the matter to the appropriate Realtor organization, if a broker's
conduct is involved, or to the appropriate lawyer's organization where a lawyer is
involved.
(e) Attempt to obtain and formulate uniform types of contracts for use in the
respective areas of the State of Illinois which forms will provide blanks for filling
in factual and business detail only and which will expedite real estate transactions
and reduce controversies to a minimum, while containing adequate safeguards to
protect both the buyer and the seller, and which are capable of becoming the
customary form or forms of contracts in use in the community as contemplated in
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the recent case of The Chicago Bar Association vs. Quinlan and Tyson. Such
forms shall be subject to the approval of the four organizations.
(f) Cooperate with the four respective organizations, as may be requested by
them, in the joint dissemination to brokers, lawyers and the public of information
on the conduct of real estate transactions.
ARTICLE IV
Approval and Dissemination
This Accord shall be in full force and effect on the date it is approved by the
four participating organizations in accordance with the respective procedures of such
organizations.
Each of the four organizations will use its best efforts to advise its members of
this Accord and jointly to advise non-member brokers and lawyers and the general
public.
APPROVED AND RECOMMENDED by the Committees from the Illinois Association of
Real Estate Boards, Chicago Real Estate Board, The Chicago Bar Association and
Illinois State Bar Association.
/S/ Marshall S. LeSueur /S/ George Kemp
Chairman, Chairman, Illinois Association of
The Chicago Bar Association, Real Estate Boards,
Committee on Quinlan-Tyson Committee on Quinlan-Tyson
/S/ Orville N. Foreman IS! William C. Groebe
Chairman, Chairman,
Illinois State Bar Association, Chicago Real Estate Board,
Committee on Quinlan-Tyson Committee on Quinlan-Tyson
APPROVED and ADOPTED by the following organizations pursuant to action of their
respective governing boards, this 26th day of October 1966.
/S/ William A. McSwain /S! M. Edward Smith
President President
The Chicago Bar Association Illinois Association of Real Estate Boards
/S/ Russell N. Sullivan /S/ Ross J. Beatty, Jr.
President President
Illinois State Bar Association Chicago Real Estate Board
